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Carbon Markets and Methane Digesters:
Potential Implications for the Dairy Sector
Nigel Key and Stacy Sneeringer
Anaerobic digesters that capture and burn manure methane can provide a renewable source of
energyandreducegreenhousegasemissions.Payingproducersfortheseemissionreductions—
either directly or through a carbon offset market—could substantially increase digester adop-
tion. However, there is likely to be wide variation in the scale, location, and characteristics of
adopters, so these policies could have long run structural implications for the livestock sector.
Using a model of digester profits and data from a nationally-representative survey of dairy
operations we estimate the likely distribution of digester adoption and profits under different
carbon price scenarios.
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Methane digesters that collect and burn methane
from manure can provide numerous benefits to
livestock producers and the environment. Di-
gesters can supply a renewable source of elec-
tricitythatcan powerfarmequipmentorbesold.
They can reduce odors from manure, lower the
potential for surface water contamination, and
aid in recycling manure solids for animal bed-
ding material. Despite these benefits, anaerobic
digesters have not been widely adopted: currently,
there are only 167 systems operating in the United
States, of which 137 are on dairies and 23 are on
hog operations (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency [USEPA], 2011).
Recently, methane digesters have received
attention because of their potential to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Methane is a potent
greenhouse gas and burning one ton of it is
equivalent to eliminating about 24 tons of car-
bon dioxide.
1 Paying farmers for these carbon
emissions reductions would provide a greater
incentive to adopt digesters and therefore could
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Farmers could
be directly compensated for these emission reduc-
tions or they could sell them in carbon offset
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1A single ton of released methane has the same
global warming potential as 25 tons of carbon dioxide
over a 100-year time period (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, 2007, Table 2.14). Burning a ton of
methane reduces its warming potential to the equiva-
lent of 1 ton of carbon dioxide – a reduction equivalent
to eliminating 24 tons of carbon dioxide. The global
warming potential of 25 is based on the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report.
Some other studies and the Official U.S. Greenhouse Gas
Inventory use a global warming potential of 21 based on
the earlier Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Second Assessment Report (1996). This value from the
Second Assessment Report has been retained in the U.S.
Greenhouse Gas Inventory calculations so that results are
comparable across years (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 2010a, pp. 1–7, 1–8).
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 2011 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationmarkets. In an offset market, producers who burn
methane from a digester sell offsets to other
greenhousegas emitters whofaceemissionscaps
or who voluntarily offset their own emissions.
Currently, U.S. livestock operations have the
option to sell manure-methane offsets in regional
or voluntary offset markets, but the carbon prices
in these markets have generally been low. How-
ever, future federal and state efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions could substantially
raise carbon prices. In 2009, the U.S. House
of Representatives approved climate legislation
(the American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009) that would have created a national carbon
offset market estimated to result in a carbon
price of $13 per ton carbon dioxide equivalent
(USEPA, 2009). The climate legislation was not
voted on by the U.S. Senate, and the prospects
for future Federal Climate legislation are un-
certain. None-the-less, several states are actively
creating a market for emissions reductions. In
particular, California and five other U.S. states
and four Canadian provinces are developing
a regional carbon trading regime as part of the
Western Climate Initiative (Western Climate
Initiative, 2010) in which livestock producers will
likely be able to sell carbon offsets (California
Environmental Protection Agency, 2011).
The additional income that could be earned
from offsets or government programs paying
for emissions reductions could make digesters
profitable for many more farmers, but there is
likely to be wide variation in the scale, location,
and characteristics of the benefitting operations.
Substantial economies of scale in construction
and maintenance of methane digesters suggest the
main beneficiaries of higher carbon prices would
be larger-scale operations. In addition, offset
markets usually require verification that emis-
sions reductions yield carbon levels lower than
original baselines.
2 Consequently, only operators
of livestock facilities that historically emit
substantial quantities of methane – e.g. dairy
and hog operations with anaerobic manure
storage facilities such as lagoons – are likely to
be able to sell carbon offsets. Regional variation
in retail electricity prices, the price received for
power sold back to the grid, and on-farm de-
mand for electricity will also influence the lo-
cation, size, and characteristics of the farms that
would benefit from adopting biogas recovery
systems.
Little empirical research assesses the po-
tential distributional impacts of higher carbon
prices, or other policies that would pay farmers
for methane emission reductions. Instead, most
studies model digester adoption for particular
regions,markets,ortypesoffarms(e.g.,Bishop
and Shumway, 2009; Lazarus and Rudstrom,
2007; Leuer, Hyde, and Richard, 2008; Stokes,
Rajagopalan and Stefanou, 2008). The research
that attempts national-level analyses is USEPA
(2006) and Gloy (2011). The Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) estimates that 6,900
mostly large-scale dairy and hog operations are
potential candidates for installing biogas re-
covery systems. However, the EPA study does
not include a benefit-cost analysis, instead de-
fining candidates for digester adoption solely
on the basis of size and manure management
method. Gloy (2011) develops a general model
of digester profitability for dairies to estimate
the potential supply of carbon offsets from the
sector, although he does not consider the po-
tential distributional implications of a national
offset market.
In this article we estimate the likely distri-
bution of benefits to dairy operations from di-
gester adoption under different carbon prices.
Expanding on Gloy (2011) we develop a model
of digester profitability based on farm size,
manure management method, electricity prices,
and digester costs to estimate how carbon price
affects producers’ decisions to adopt methane
digesters. We parameterize the model using
information from multiple case studies to re-
flect farm-level costs and experiences with
energy production. State-level data are used
to account for regional variation in electricity
prices, methane emissions, and energy sources.
We use the model to estimate discounted
2The determination of baseline emissions, and there-
fore what emissions reductions qualify for offsets varies
somewhat across emission trading regimes. The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency guidelines suggest that the
‘‘emission baseline for a manure management methane
collection and combustion project is the manure man-
agement system in place prior to the project’’ (USEPA,
2008).
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dairy version of the nationally representative U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA)-Agricultural
Resource Management Survey (ARMS), and
thereby predict the number, size, and location of
farms adopting digesters at given carbon offset
prices. Results provide insight into the distribu-
tional implications for the dairy sector and point
to several policy approaches that could increase
the number of small-scale producers benefiting
from higher carbon prices.
Methane Emissions and Carbon Markets
Many livestock operations store manure mixed
with water in lagoons, ponds, pits, or tanks,
yielding anaerobic (without oxygen) conditions.
Insuchconditions,thedecompositionofmanure
produces a biogas containing about 60% meth-
ane (the remaining gas consists primarily of car-
bon dioxide, plus small amounts of toxic gases,
including hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, and sul-
fur derived mercaptans). When manure is han-
dled as a solid or deposited on fields it tends to
decompose aerobically (with oxygen) and pro-
duce much less methane. The quantity of methane
released also depends on climate (temperature
and rainfall), with more methane generated at
warmer temperatures.
In 2008, the ‘‘Agriculture’’sector, as defined
by the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, generated 6.1% of
total U.S. greenhouse gas emissions (USEPA,
2010a, pp. 2–12);
3 methane from manure man-
agement comprised 10.5% of these agricultural
emissions.
4 Dairy and hog operations, which
often use anaerobic storage, were responsible
for 43.1% and 43.6% of methane emissions
from manure management, respectively (USEPA,
2010a, Table 6–6). Beef cattle, sheep, poul-
try, and horses were collectively the source of
only 13.3% of total manure methane, as these
sectors generally handle manure aerobically.
Geographic shifts and increasing scale of
production have led to a greater share of
dairy cattle and swine in facilities using an-
aerobic storage, resulting in a 54% increase
b e t w e e n1 9 9 0a n d2 0 0 8i nm e t h a n ee m i s -
sions from manure handling (USEPA, 2010a,
Table 6–2).
A methane digester, also called an ‘‘anaer-
obic digester,’’ ‘‘biogas recovery system,’’ or
‘‘biodigester’’ collects manure from anaerobic
storage facilities, optimizes it for the pro-
duction of methane by adjusting temperature
and water content, captures the resulting bio-
gas, and burns it for heat or electricity gener-
ation. There are three main of types of digesters
that can be used with either lagoon or pit-based
manure storage facilities: complete-mix, plug
flow, and covered lagoon. A complete-mix
digester is a large concrete or steel container,
usually circular in shape. A plug-flow digester
is often a below-ground trough with an air-tight
expandable cover. A covered lagoon digester is
an earthen pond fitted with an impermeable
cover on its surface. Covered lagoon digesters
are generally less expensive to construct than
complete-mix and plug flow digesters, but la-
goon digesters cannot be heated to increase
methane output in cooler climates.
Burning methane leads to a considerable
reduction in its potential to warm the atmo-
sphere; as such, biogas recovery systems have
received attention in efforts to reduce global
warming. There is an expanding international
effort to reduce methane emissions using mar-
ket mechanisms. The U.S. government through
the EPA and other agencies has partnered with
38 other countries in the Global Methane Ini-
tiative (formerly Methane to Markets Partner-
ship) to promote methane recovery and use.
The initiative targets several sources of meth-
ane emissions including livestock waste man-
agement (Global Methane Initiative, 2011). In
2010, the United States pledged $50 million
over 5 years to the Global Methane Initiative
(USEPA, 2010b).
3As defined by the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, ‘‘Agriculture’’ sector
emissions do not include emissions from those inputs
to agricultural production that are attributed to other
sectors, including fertilizer production, transportation,
and electricity generation.
4Livestock also emit methane from enteric fer-
mentation produced during digestion. In 2008, over
three times as much methanewas released from enteric
fermentation as from manure management (USEPA,
2010, Table 2–8).
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One approach to mitigate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from manure management is to com-
pensate farmers for emissions reductions,
either through government payments or a car-
bon offset market (other approaches include
cost-shareprograms, technology orperformance
standards, emissions taxes, and subsidies for
digester-generated electricity.) Such a market-
allows individuals or firms to ‘‘offset’’ their own
emissions by paying someone else to reduce
greenhousegas emissions. Carbonoffsets can be
exchanged in compliance or voluntary markets.
Compliance markets usually operate under a
cap-and-trade regime that places a legal limit
on the quantity of greenhouse gases that reg-
ulated firms can emit in a particular time
period. To meet their emissions targets, regu-
lated firms could reduce their own emissions or
purchase emissions permits from other ‘‘cap-
ped’’ firms. Alternatively, such firms could pay
non-regulated emitters, such as livestock op-
erations, to reduce emissions by purchasing
offsets.
Compliance markets have been established
at the international, national, and regional
levels. Regimes that govern international
compliance markets include the Kyoto Protocol
and the European Union’s Emissions Trading
Scheme. In the United States, 10 eastern states
recently implemented the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative (RGGI), the first manda-
tory market-based greenhouse gas reduction
effort in the United States Under the RGGI, the
capped sector (power generation) can purchase
offsets from projects that reduce manure-based
methane emissions. In 2009, the U.S. House of
Representatives approved climate change
legislation (H.R. 2454, the American Clean
Energyand Security Act of2009) that, if signed
into law, would have established a national cap-
and-trade system and provided a further
opportunity for farmers to sell offsets from re-
ducing their manure methane emissions.
Voluntary offset markets function outside of
compliance markets and allow companies and
individuals to purchase carbon offsets without
being legislatively compelled. For example,
individuals might seek to offset their travel
emissions or firms might seek to compensate
for emissions related to their production. In the
United States, the Chicago Climate Exchange
(CCX) is a voluntary, but legally binding, car-
bon trading regime in which methane emis-
sions reductions from livestock operations can
qualify as offset projects.
In the major international compliance mar-
kets, carbon offset prices have ranged between
$15 and $30 per ton of carbon dioxide equiv-
alent emissions in the last decade.
5 In overseas
voluntary markets, prices have ranged between
$5 and $15/ton of carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions (tCO2e). In the United States, offset
prices have been lower. The average price for
carbon allowances in the RGGI has ranged
between $1 and $3/tCO2e between 2008 and
2010 (RGGI, 2011). The CCX carbon price has
ranged between $1 and $7/tCO2e since 2004,
but has been trading at its floor price under $1/
tCO2e between 2009 and 2010 (Chicago
Climate Exchange, 2010). While a carbon price
under a national cap-and-trade system is hy-
pothetical, the EPA estimated that in the near-
term, the proposed House bill (H.R. 2454)
would have resulted in a price of $13/tCO2e
(USEPA, 2009). However, the carbon price
could fall short of or exceed this level over the
medium or long term.
A livestock operation’s potential offset rev-
enues from a digester system depend on its
pre-offset program ‘‘baseline’’ emissions,
which are a function of type of manure storage
and handling. Offset programs usually require
documentation of baseline emissions and cer-
tification that emissions are reduced below this
level (the so-called ‘‘additionality’’ requirement).
Since certification is not without costs, only op-
erations that generate significant quantities
of methane would likely find enrolling in offset
programs cost-beneficial. This largely limits the
pool of potential offset providers to operations
usinganaerobicmanurestoragefacilitiessuchas
lagoon or pit systems, which are largely in the
5Offsets are measured in tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions. Reductions in other greenhouse
gases such as methane are converted to an equivalent
quantity of carbon dioxide based on that gas’s relative
global warming potential.
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manure management would likely not qualify
to sell offsets by installing digesters, as this
would require switching to anaerobic facilities
with higher emissions.
Factors Affecting Digester Profits
Several factors influence the profitability of
methane digesters, and consequently determine
the characteristics of the producers who are likely
to adopt the technology. These factors include
the typeofmanuremanagementsystem, thestart-
up and ongoing costs of digester technology,
the price of electricity, and on-farm electricity
expenditures. Many of these factors vary with
operation size and region, suggesting that di-
gester adoption and subsequent benefits will
also vary by size and region.
A concentrated supply of methane is nec-
essary for the effective running of an electrical
generator associated with a digester. As such,
only operations that store manure in anaerobic
conditions generating significant quantities of
methane are viable candidates for biogas re-
covery systems (unless an operation converts to
a different management method). Anaerobic
manure management systems can be catego-
rized as either ‘‘lagoon’’ or ‘‘pit’’ type systems
(these general categories encompass several
types of manure management systems, as de-
tailed in Appendix B). The 2005 ARMS data
indicate that about 50% of dairies have an
anaerobic manure system, 16% use an aerobic
system (open slab or covered shed), and 34%
report having no manure storage system.
Anaerobic manure management systems are
generally less common on small-scale operations.
For example, only 46% of dairy operations with
fewer than 250 head use anaerobic manure man-
agement systems compared with 73–88% of op-
erations in larger size categories (Table 1). Larger
operations are also more likely to have lagoon
manure systems, which have higher initial meth-
ane emission rates thanpit systems. Consequently,
larger operations produce relatively more methane
per head. For example, dairies with more than
2,500 head are responsible for 18.8% of total
emissions, though only produce 13.0% of total
output(gross value of dairy enterprise production).
There is substantial variation across regions in
manure management methods and consequently
in methane emissions (Table 1). Dairies in the
W e s ta n dS o u t ha r em u c hm o r el i k e l yt oh a v e
lagoon systems than those in the Midwest and
Northeast, in part because of differences in cli-
mate. Dairies in the West and South produce
59.2% of all emissions from the dairy sector,
despite producing only 42.5% of output.
Farm size is an important determinant of di-
gester profitability because it is associated with
manure management methods and because of
economies of scale in construction and mainte-
nance of methane digesters. As illustrated by the
case study data described below, the costs of
constructing, maintaining, and repairing the
storage facility and generator generally decline
on a per-unit basis. Finally, there are numerous
fixed transaction costs associated with selling
electricity or certifying and marketing offsets
that do not vary substantially with farm size.
Larger operations can spread these fixed costs
over a larger revenue base.
Electricity price, on-farm use, and digester
generation are also key determinants of digester
profitability. As an operation’s use and the retail
price of electricity increase, so will the potential
valueofadigester.TheARMSdataindicatethatan
averagedairywith 154 head ofcowsused128,918
kWhofelectricityperyear,or1,048kWhperhead.
While larger operations use more electricity over-
all, they use less per head (Table 1). Electricity use
alsovariesacrossregions:onaverage,Midwestern
dairies use 1,102 kWh of electricity per head com-
pared with Southern dairies’ 791 kWh per head,
reflectingdifferencesinaverageoperationsizeand
climate.Regionalvariationintheretailprice(Table
1) may also yield heterogeneity in potential di-
gester value. For example, dairies in the West paid
an average of 5.8 cents per kWh compared with
8.5 cents in the Northeast.
In some cases, the value of the digester-
generated electricity depends on an operator’s
a b i l i t yt ot i m eg e n e r at i o nt oc o i n c i d ew i t ho n - f ar m
use. This coordination problem can be mitigated
or eliminated in states with ‘‘net metering’’ laws.
Under net metering, when surplus electricity is
produced on-farm, the electricity meter spins
backward, effectively saving the electricity until it
is needed and replacing purchased electricity at





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2011 574the retail price. Over the billing period, the oper-
ation is only billed for its net electricity usage.
Forty states have adopted net metering laws, al-
though their specifics vary (Database for State
Incentives for Renewable Energy [DSIRE],
2010). While many states’ net metering laws have
maximum generator sizes above those found in
digester systems, in some states the maximum
generator size is lower than what would be opti-
mally used with a digester (DSIRE, 2010).
6 Op-
erators in states facing a binding generator size
limit may not obtain the full retail price for the
electricity they generate but do not consume.
Net metering laws can allow a farm to receive
the retail price for generated electricity used on-
farm. However, excess electricity that is sold to
the grid may only command the wholesale price
(the price that utilities pay for electricity from
large-scale generators). Sincewholesale prices for
electricity are below retail, electricity that is sold
would be worth less than that used on-farm.
However, since manure-derived electricity is
from a renewable source, the selling price for
surplus electricity could enjoy a substantial
premium over wholesale. About 30 states require
utilities to purchase a share of power from re-
newable sources, including from biogas sys-
tems (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009).
Climate change legislation that raises the
price of carbon could also be expected to increase
electricity prices. Regions where electricity is
generated using more carbon-intensive methods
would likely see the larger price increases.
Methane digesters can offer other benefits
to livestock producers beyond carbon offset
sales and electricity generation, which could
affect their adoption decision. Covers and well-
managed anaerobic digestion can substantially
reduce odors from lagoon manure storage (Pain
et al., 1990; Welsh et al., 1977; Wilkie et al.,
1995). Digesters can reduce the potential for
surface water contamination from pathogens
which can be hazardous to animal and human
health (Demuynck, Nyns, and Naveau, 1985).
By excluding rainwater, a lagoon cover can sub-
stantially increase a lagoon’s storage capacity
and thereby reduce the size or number of lagoons
required per operation (Shepherd et al., 2010).
An anaerobic digester can also be designed to
accept food waste from local food processors or
manure from local operations, which can provide
additional ‘‘fuel’’ for the digester and a potential
source of revenue from ‘‘tipping fees’’ charged to
the waste depositors (Bishop and Shumway,
2009).
7 Farms that use a solids separator can
sell the collected solids as bedding material or
use them on-farm for bedding. Separated solids
can be sold as a soil amendment, which can
provide a significant source of income (Leuer,
Hyde, and Richard, 2008).
Empirical Framework
We use a model of digester profitability to predict
adoption rates and revenue by size and region.
Our approach is similar to Gloy (2011), but we
extend his analysis by allowing the adoption
decision to be based on the digester project’s net
present value (NPV) instead of annual profits,
estimating parameters using case study data,
setting electricity prices to be a function of the
carbon offset price, adding transactions costs
associated with carbon offset market participa-
tion, and incorporating electricity production
variation by state for lagoon-based digesters.
Investment Model
We use the net present value to assess the
profitabilityofadigesterproject.TheNPVisthe
sum of future net revenues (e.g., revenues from
electricity and carbon offsets minus capital and
variable costs) over the life of the project,
6In two compilations of digester case studies for
dairies, generator capacities ranged from 75kW to
775kW(DairyPowerProductionProgram,2006; Kramer,
2004). Maximum generator sizes for net metering in the
states in our sample range from 10kW in Indiana to no
specified limit in Arizona and Ohio (DSIRE, 2010).
7In the case study analyzed byBishop and Shumway
(2009), accepting food waste was found to be profit-
able for the digester owner, while transportation costs
made accepting manure from local farms unprofit-
able. A potential downside to using food waste is that
it can elevate the nutrient content of the manure
spread on fields. In some regions, land available for
manure spreading is limited so extra manure nutrients
can increase manure spreading costs or the risk of
water pollution.
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who is considering investing in a methane di-
gester has two related decisions: the decision to
construct a digester that will produce electricity
and the decision to sell carbon offsets. An op-
erator with a digester will also sell offsets if the
discounted stream ofoffset revenuesexceedsthe
expected discounted transaction costs of par-
ticipating in the market. Hence, there are three
possible outcomes:
(1)
NPVD £ 0 and NPVD 1NPVM £ 0:
noinvestment
NPVD > 0 and NPVM £ 0:constructdigester
butdonotselloffsets
NPVD 1NPVM > 0:constructdigesterand
selloffsets
where NPVDis the net present value of the digester
and NPVM is the net present value of participat-
ing in a carbon offset market. A fourth possibility
would be to construct a digester without an elec-
tricity generator and to flare the methane and sell
offsets. This scenario is not considered in this study.
The NPV of the digester enterprise for op-
eration i, located in state s, using manure man-
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where T represents the lifespan of the digester,
t indexes time, d is the discount rate, Risft is the
value ofgenerated electricity (used on-farmand/
or sold), and Cift is the cost of constructing and
maintaining the digester.
The value of electricity generated by the
digester Risft depends on time and on whether
the quantity generated on-farm EG
if is less than
or greater than the quantity used on-farm EU
i :
If the quantity generated is less than or equal
to what is used on-farm, then the generated
electricity is valued at thebuying (‘‘retail’’) price
PER
s . If more electricity is generated than is used
on-farm, then this surplus electricity (EG
if   EU
i )
is valued at the selling (‘‘wholesale’’) price PEW
s .
Since the power generation sector is likely
to be affected by climate change legislation, we
allow the retail and wholesale electricity prices to
depend on the carbon intensity of the state energy
sources and the price of carbon. Specifically,
the retail price of electricity is a function of the
observed current retail price PE
s plus an increase
that is proportional to the average carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions rate from power plants fs




s 1 0:00045   fs   PM,
where we multiply by 0.00045 to convert pounds
to metric tons.
The selling price of farm-generated elec-
tricity will likely also increase with the carbon
price. For simplicity, the selling price of elec-
tricity is assumed to be less than the retail price




s   uW.
Electricity generation depends on the type of
manure storage and the quantity of manure pro-
duced. Since the quantity of manure produced is a
linear function ofthe number of head,thequantity
of electricity generated can be expressed as:
(6) EG
if 5 esf   Ni.
Pit systems generate substantially more electric-
ity per head than lagoon systems. This is mainly
because pit systems are heated in the cooler
months to optimize methane production, and
therefore electricity output. Since covered la-
goon digesters cannot be heated, the amount of
electricity generated per head will depend on
the climate. To account for differences in
generation capacity in lagoon systems, we ad-
just esf for lagoons by the methane emissions in
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msf
m , for f 5 lagoon,
where   m and esf aretheaveragemethaneemission
factor and electricity generation for the lagoon
operations in the case study sample (described
below). Electricity generation per head for oper-
ations with pits(having complete mix orplug flow
digesters) is assumed not to vary across states,
because methane production can be maintained
year-round by heating.
The costs of the biogas system consist of the
capital investment Kif at the beginning of the
project (t 5 0) plus maintenance and operating




Vif if 1 £ t £ T
 
Capital investment includes costs of the con-
structing and designing the pump, pit, heating,
building, solids separator, effluent holder, genera-
tor, and power lines. A share of capital investment
1 2 l is born by a government cost-share pro-
gram. The capital investment increases with the
scale of the operation at a decreasing rate that de-
pends on parameters af and bf. The cost of this
investment is:
(9) Kif 5af   Ni ðÞ
bf
Annual variable costs Vif include costs of
maintenance andrepairs. Followingpast studies,
we assume that variable costs are proportional to
the quantity of electricity generated (which de-
pends on farm size and type of manure handling
facility):
(10) Vif 5 v   EG
if 5 v   ef   Ni.
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Misthe price ofcarbon offsets ($/t CO2e),
Misft is the quantity of methane that could be sold
in the offset market, and Zt represents transaction
costs associated with selling carbon offsets.
The quantity of methane produced and burned
that would qualify for offset sales is:
(12) Misft 5
0i f t 5 0
Ni  msf  24 365 0:001 if 1 £ t £ T
 
where Ni is the number of head and msf is the
state methane emission factor (kg CH4 per head
per day), which is multiplied by 24 (t CO2e/t
CH4), 365 (days per year), and 0.001 (tons per
kg) in order to express Misft in tons of carbon
dioxide equivalents (t CO2e).
Transaction costs associated with selling
carbon offsets include the initial one-time fixed
start-up cost for entering the offset market (Z
E)
plus on-going annual costs of monitoring and
verification (Z
V):
(13) Zt 5 ZE if t 5 0
ZV if 1 £ t £ T.
 
The NPV approach used in this analysis
is deterministic in the sense that real prices are
assumed to be known and constant by the oper-
ator throughout the economic life of the digester.
In fact, many of the benefits and costs associated
with a digester are uncertain and variable. For
example, the price of electricity – both the retail
and selling price – is likely to fluctuate depend-
ing on global economic conditions and policy
changes that are difficult to predict. There is also
uncertainty about digester variable costs and
methane and electrical output, which could fluc-
tuate from year to year depending on system
reliabilityand unexpected weather or mechanical
failures. Although we do not explicitly account
for the stochastic nature of the determinants of
digester benefits and costs, we characterize the
range of possible outcomes using sensitivity anal-
yses for the key variables.
If we had information about the probability
distribution of prices and other model param-
eters, then it would be possible to estimate the
distribution of the NPV, which would provide
a more accurate representation of a digester
project’s value (Leuer, Hyde, and Richard, 2008).
A further extension could also take into account
the irreversible nature of a digester investment.
Stokes, Rajagopalan, and Stefanou (2008) use
a real option framework to estimate thevalue to
a producer of the option to delay investment in
8This study does not explicitly consider costs
associated with obtaining air quality permits or costs
associated with installing equipment to comply with
air quality standards. Recent news accounts suggest
that in some regions or states (such as California) these
costs could be substantial (Huffstutter, 2010).
Key and Sneeringer: Carbon Markets and Methane Digesters 577a digester. The authors find that producers
would require significant financial compensa-
tion – perhaps in the form of assured grant
funding or greater electricity prices to imme-
diately adopt the technology, rather than delay
investment even if the NPV is positive.
Bynot accounting for thestochasticnature of
a digester’sbenefitsandcostsortheoptionvalue
of delaying investment, we may overestimate
the value of digester systems and consequently
overestimate digester adoption. However, as
noted in the text, we do not account for some
possible benefits from a digester such as from
‘‘tipping fees’’ or bedding sales, which reduces
our estimate of the project’s value. In addition,
the study does not account for non-market
benefits from a digester such as odor control, or
reducedwaterorairpollution,which also causes
us to underestimate the private and social ben-
efits of the project. The model used in this study
does not accountforthevalueofthese additional
benefits because they can vary widely across
farms and regions, and we do not have sufficient
data to estimate values of these benefits for in-
dividual farms used in the policy simulations.
Case Studies and Parameter Values
The model parameters, units, and data sources
used are shown in Table 2. We estimate elec-
tricity generation and cost parameters using
information from multiple case studies drawn
from compilations (Dairy Power Production
Program, 2006; Kramer, 2004), individual proj-
ect descriptions (Bishop and Shumway, 2009),
and a dataset of vendor quotes for prospective
digester projects (described in USEPA, 2010c).
9
Other case studies and certain vendor quotes
were excluded fromconsiderationif they did not
meet the following conditions:
1) The digester was built in 2000 or later to
reflect current technology. (This excluded
certain operations listed in Kramer, 2004;
Lazarus and Rudstrom, 2007; Lusk, 1998;
and Wright and Perschke, 1998.)
2) The case study farm or vendor quote in-
cluded a generator for electricity production.
This excluded digesters that were constructed
solely for odor control and those to be used
just to flare methane.
3) The digester was located on an individual farm
operation. This excluded digesters at research
stations and those that combined manure or
other byproducts from multiple sources. This
also excluded data collected and synthesized
by other researchers or generated by economic
models (e.g., Crenshaw, 2009; Gloy, 2011;
Leuer, Hyde, and Richard, 2008; Stokes,
Rajagopalan, and Stefanou, 2008).
4) The case study provided information on the
type of digester, specifically whether it was
a lagoon- or pit-based system.
5) The case study or vendor quote provided
start-up cost estimates.
6) For case studies, the name of the farm was
provided or the farm could be uniquely distin-
guished inanother fashion (e.g., it wasin a state
with no other case studies). This was required
to avoid double-counting, as several digesters
were the subjects of multiple case studies.
We identified 14 case studies and 31 vendor
quotes that satisfied the above conditions. The
average farm size, capital and variable costs,
and per-head electricity output for the farms
used in the analysis are displayed in the Ap-
pendix A,Table A1.We updateall digester costs
to 2009 dollars using Chemical Engineering’s
PlantCostIndex(seewww.che.com/pci).Forthe
37 case studies or vendor quotes for pit-based
digesters, investment costs average $958/cow
and range from $274/cow to $1,672/cow; for the
eight lagoon-based digester case studies or ven-
dor quotes, investment costs average $863/cow
and range from $238/cow to $1,564/cow.
Construction costs per head for the case study
or vendor quote operations decline with farm size
(see Appendix A, Table A1). To estimate the cost
model parameters (af and bf from Equation [9])




5 af 1 bf ln Nif
  
1 eif,
where Kif is total observed capital construction
costs for case study operation i using manure
9In earlier work, we used a different set of case studies
to estimate capital and variable cost parameters and
electricity generation parameters (Key and Sneeringer,
2011).
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Value Units Description Source
Estimated Parameters
ef 5 pi 729 kWh/cow Electricity produced per





ef 5 lagoon 450  
msf 5 lagoon
  m kWh/cow Electricity produced
per cow at an operation
utilizing a lagoon-based
digester
vf 5 pit 0.046 $/kWh Variable cost for
pit-based digester
vf 5 lagoon 0.037 $/kWh Variable cost for
lagoon-based digester












bf 5 pi 0.596 No unit
af 5 lagoon 39,020 No unit Capital investment
cost parameter for
lagoon-based digesters
bf 5 lagoon 0.454 No unit
PE





























d 0.05 rate Discount rate
t 15 years Economic life of
a digester
Z
E 10,000 $ Initial offset market
transaction costs
Z
V 3,000 $ Annual offset market
transaction costs
PM Varies by policy $/t CO2e Price per ton of CO2e
l Varies by policy % Percentage of capital
investment paid by
operator after cost-share
program; (1 2 l) is the
portion paid by the program.
Key and Sneeringer: Carbon Markets and Methane Digesters 579facility type f. The parameters in Equation (9)
are computed from the estimated parameters
as follows: af 5 exp ^ af
  
and bf 5 ^ bf.W ee s -
timate separate regressions for the pit and lagoon
operations(showninthe AppendixA, TableA2).
The coefficients are plausible and statistically
significant at the 10% level.
10
For the variable cost parameter v from
Equation (10) we use simple averages for the
nine case studies for which variable costs are
reported (Appendix A, Table A1). For pit sys-
tems, the parameter value is $0.046/kWh; for
lagoon systems it is $0.037/kWh.
We estimate the electricity generation pa-
rameteresf separately for lagoon and pit systems
as the average values from eight pit operations
andfourlagooncase studies(AppendixA,Table
A1).Since thelagooncasestudiesare alllocated
in California, we adjust the electricity genera-
tionparameter forlagoons by multiplyingbythe
ratio of the individual observation’s state emis-
sion factor and the California emissions factor.
This accounts for state-level differences in meth-
ane emissions, and consequently, in electricity
generation.
For state electricity prices, we use the 2009
retail electricity prices for the industrial sector,
which includes agriculture (U.S. Energy In-
formationAdministration, 2010a, Table 5.6.B).
11
In the ‘‘Sensitivity Analyses’’ section, we illus-
trate the implications of relaxing the assumption
that operations receive the full retail value for the
electricity they generate. Examining the effects
of a 25% lower rate allows us to consider what
may happen if operations are in states without
net metering laws, are in states with net metering
laws but with low maximum generator sizes, or
receive less than the retail rate for the electricity
generated for other reasons.
12 We also examine
the effect of a 25% higher retail rate to consider
the case where operations instead pay residential
rates for electricity (rather than industrial), which
are generally higher.
The average retail price of electricity in the
United States (all end uses) in 2008 was 9.8 cents
per kilowatt-hour (kWh), with distribution and
transmission costs comprising 3.1 cents per kWh
(generation comprises the remaining 6.7 cents)
(U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2010b).
Accordingly, we define the difference between the
retail and wholesale prices as 3.1 cents, which is
assumed not to vary across states. The case studies
indicate that electricity selling prices rangewidely,
even within an individual state.
13 In the ‘‘Sensi-
tivity Analyses’’ section we illustrate scenarios in
which the selling price is substantially lower and
higher than $0.031 below the retail price to reflect
potential experiences with renewable energy pol-
icies (higher prices) and difficulty selling elec-
tricity to the grid (lower prices).
The methane emission factors for manure
management msf are based on Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change tier 2 standards
(Chicago Climate Exchange, 2009, Tables 3–4).
The carbon emissions factors fsfor electricity use
by region are from the Department of Energy’s
publication ‘‘Carbon Dioxide Emissions from the
Generation of Electric Power’’ (U.S. Department
of Energy, 2000). We assign the same carbon
emissions factor to each state within the region.
We begin by assuming that farmers pay 75%
of the full capital investment for digester pro-
jects, with government cost-sharing programs
10One potential concern with the lagoon parameter
estimates stems from the fact that all the lagoon case
studies were located in California. It is possible that
lagoon size (and consequently costs) will vary with
climate – with lagoons in cooler climates being larger
to allow for sufficient manure decomposition over the
year. We were unable to account for this possibility be-
cause we lack information on how the costs of construct-
ing a lagoon digester vary based on location or climate.
11The U.S. Energy Information Agency defines the
industrial sector ‘‘encompasses the following types of
activity manufacturing (NAICS codes 31–33); agri-
culture, forestry, fishing and hunting (NAICS code
11); mining, including oil and gas extraction (NAICS
code 21); and construction (NAICS code 23). Overall
energy use in this sector is largely for process heat and
cooling and powering machinery, with lesser amounts
used for facility heating, air conditioning, and lighting.’’
12Because state net metering laws are in flux (there
has been a rapid movement toward more states adopt-
ing net metering laws) we do not attempt to model
specific policies at the state level.
13For example, the Dairy Power Production Pro-
gram (2006) notes that individual digester projects
within the state of California received between $0.03
and $0.10/kWh for net electricity generation. In 2006
the California industrial price for electricity was
$0.109/kWh.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2011 580covering 25%. In our sensitivity analysis we
examine the effect of modifying this assumption
to show effects ofreducingthegovernment cost-
sharing rate to 0% and raising it to 50%.
We apply the model to each farm included in
t h e2 0 0 5D a i r yP r o d u c t i o nP r a c t i c e sa n dC o s t s
and Returns Report, which is part of the Agri-
culturalResourceManagementSurvey(ARMS).
The ARMS is a restricted-use dataset compiled
by the National Agricultural Statistics Service in
conjunction with the Economic Research Ser-
vice of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The
ARMS contains information on the number and
type of animals, type of manure management
system, and costs of electricity consumed. More
information about the ARMS data and variables
is given in Appendix B.
Results
Table 3 displays the potential digester adoption
rates and estimated revenues by size and region
for dairies when the offset price is $13/tCO2e
and $26/tCO2e.
14 Results indicate that even at
the moderate carbon price of $13/tCO2e, offset
sales could provide a substantial new source of
revenues for farms with digesters. At this price,
the revenue from offset sales represents 62%
of the gross present value of the digester for
dairies (electricity generation is responsible for
the remaining 38%). At the higher carbon price
of $26/tCO2e, offset sales represent 72% of the
present value of gross returns.
There is a positive relationship between
farm size and digester adoption rates. With an
offset price of $13/tCO2e, no dairies with fewer
than 500 head would find it profitable to adopt
a digester, compared with 23.6% of dairies with
500–999 head, 42.5% of operations with 1,000–
2,499 head, and 65.6% of operations with more
than 2,500 head. A higher carbon price lowers
the size threshold above which farms find it
profitable to operatea digester, andincreases the
number of farms that would adopt a digester. At
a carbon price of $26 per ton, 0.1% of dairies
with fewer than 250 head, 33.4% of dairies with
250–499 head, 48.9% of dairies with 500–999
head, and over 70% of dairies with over 1,000
head would find it profitable to adopt a digester.
Net revenues from digesters flow mainly to
large-scale operations. With a carbon price of
$13, the NPV of digesters on dairies with at
least 2,500 head is $361 million or 63% of total
value of digesters in the dairy sector. Dairies
with at least 1,000 head would earn 93% of the
NPV, while no dairies with fewer than 500 head
would find a digester profitable. While digester
profits accrue predominantly to large farms over
a range of carbon prices, higher prices increase
the number of smaller farms that could benefit
from an offset program, and cause the distribu-
tion of benefits to become somewhat less skewed
toward the largest operations. For example, dair-
ies with at least 2,500 head earn 100% of digester
profits with no offset market compared with
63% when the offset price is $13/tCO2e and
42% when the price is $26/tCO2e.
Regional Variation
Figure 1 illustrates, for each state in the sample,
the number of operations on which digesters are
predicted to have a positive NPV when carbon
offsets are priced at $13/tCO2e and $26/tCO2e.
The data used to construct the figures are drawn
from the USDA ARMS 2005 survey of dairy
producers, which was conducted only in the states
accounting for most dairy production.
Digester adoption rates would be highest
in the states in the West, reflecting the region’s
prevalence of anaerobic systems, particularly la-
goons. At a carbon price of $13/tCO2e, dairies in
the West receive 60.6% of total digester value,
despite producing only 33% of total dairy pro-
duction. The higher income from digesters in the
West mainly reflects the larger scale of produc-
tion in that region, but also reflects the region’s
large share of anaerobic systems (the West pro-
duces 44% of total methane emissions, as shown
in Table 1).
The figure shows that with an offset price of
$13/tCO2e, there would be over 400 dairies in
California, and between 50 and 100 dairies in
Arizona, Florida, New Mexico, New York, and
Texas that would find it profitable to adopt
14With no market for carbon offsets (a carbon price
ofzero)weestimatethatdigesterswouldhaveapositive
NPVon 18 dairies.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2011 582a digester. At a price of $26/tCO2e, all of the
dairy states see an increase in the number of po-
tential digester adopters. At the higher price, over
200 producers in Idaho, Texas, and Wisconsin,
and nearly 1,000 producers in California would
find it profitable to adopt a digester.
A clearer geographic pattern emerges when
we examine the share of operations in each
state that would earn a positive NPV from a
digester project (Figure 2). In the Midwest and
Northeast, fewer than 4% of operations in each
statewould find a digester profitable, even with
a carbon price of $26/tCO2e. In contrast, at $26/
tCO2e over 50% of operations in Florida and
Texas in the South, and Arizona, California,
and New Mexico in the West would find a di-
gester profitable.
Sensitivity Analyses
To illustrate how sensitive the model results are
to the parametric assumptions, we perform three
sensitivity analyses of key variables. All the anal-
yses are performed using the same parameters as
in the above analyses and a carbon price of $13/
tCO2e. First, we consider a range of assumptions
about the share of digester construction costs
borne by the operator. Specifically we consider
the effects of policies or programs that pay for
0% and 50% of construction costs (Table 4). Cost
share programs could take a variety of forms,
including grants (e.g., the U.S. Department of
Agriculture Rural Energy for America Program
Grants), tax credits (e.g., the Renewable Elec-
tricity Production Tax Credit), accelerated de-
preciation (Accelerated Cost Recovery System,
which allows qualifying renewable energy sys-
tems to be depreciated using an accelerated
schedule), and property and sales tax exemptions
(usually at the state level).
15 We estimate that the
number of operations on which a digester would
be profitable would decline by almost 50% with
no cost share, and would more than double with
a 50% cost share. Notably, most of the dairies
affected by this change in cost sharing rate are in
the smaller size range (less than 1,000 head), as
Figure 1. Number of Dairies Predicted to Adopt Methane Digesters, by State; Carbon Price per
Ton of $13 and $26
15The USDA Rural Energy for America Program
provides grants for up to 25% of total eligible project
costs up to $500,000. Combined with other grants,
incentives, and tax savings, it is possible that growers
could reduce construction costs by as much as 50%.
Key and Sneeringer: Carbon Markets and Methane Digesters 583almost all of the larger farms that could feasibly
adopt a digester would have done so without the
cost share benefit.
Next, consider the effect of varying the elec-
tricity retail price (Table 5). In the base scenario,
the retail electricity price is defined as the annual
average for the industrial sector for the state. The
table shows the effect of a 25% increase and
decrease in the price relative to the base price. If
retail prices were 25% lower, the number of
operations that would find digesters profitable
declines by about 30%, while at a higher price
Table 4. Sensitivity Analysis for Rate of Government Cost Share



















All farms 934 $574 473 $367 1,953 $929
Number of Head
>2500 163 $361 131 $283 176 $443
1,000–2,499 390 $172 278 $81 622 $325
500–999 381 $42 64 $3 743 $145
250–499 0 $0 0 $0 412 $16
<250 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Region
West 556 $348 235 $233 1,155 $560
Midwest 84 $48 78 $23 230 $83
South 176 $89 78 $53 350 $151
Northeast 118 $90 81 $59 218 $135
Notes: Carbon price 5 $13/ton. All values are in 2009 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Figure2. Percentage of Dairies Predicted to Adopt Methane Digesters, by State; Carbon Price per
Ton of $13 and $26
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34%. Digester net revenues respond in similar
proportions. Again, most of the response to
price occurs amongst operations with fewer
than 1,000 head.
The third sensitivity analysis considers vari-
ations in the selling price of electricity for the
farm (Table 6). In the baseline scenario we as-
sumed that operations could sell surplus elec-
tricity at the ‘‘wholesale’’ price – i.e., the price
that the utility pays for electricity, which is as-
sumed to be $0.031/kWh below the retail price.
In reality, the selling price could be higher or
lower than the wholesale price. In some regions,
operators incur connection fees and standby
charges (to provide electricity in the case that
a farm’s generator goes out of service) if they
sell electricity. Alternatively, digester-generated
electricity could be a substantial premium earned
above the wholesale price, because it is gener-
ated from a ‘‘renewable’’ source. The premium
for renewable energy certificates varies between
about 0.5 and 5.5 cents/kWh and averages about
2 cents per kilowatt hour (U.S. Department of
Energy, 2011). Table 6 shows how the number of
operations and profits change if the selling price
is zero or equal to the retail price. The results
indicate that the number of operations and pro-
fits are not very sensitive to the selling price of
electricity. This is likely because at a carbon
price of $13/tCO2, electricity sales comprise
only 5.4% of gross revenues from the digester.
Conclusion
Model simulations show that a national carbon
offset market could substantially increase the
number ofU.S. dairyproducers whowould find
it profitable to install a methane digester. With
a carbon price of $13/tCO2e, we estimate that
934 dairy operations would find it profitable to
adopt a digester and the total NPVof digesters
having a 15-year lifetime is about $574 million.
At this carbon price, carbon offset sales would
represent 62% of the present value of gross
returns from the digester.
Results indicate total digester profits and
profits per-head from digesters both generally
increase with farm size over a range of carbon
offset prices. We found that with a carbon price
of $13/tCO2e, dairies with at least 1,000 head
earn93%ofdairy-sectordigesterprofits.Larger-
scale operations benefit more because the costs
ofconstructing and maintaining a digester donot
increase in proportion with digester size and
because these larger operations are more likely
to use manure management methods that emit
more methane.

























All farms 934 $574 656 $423 1,251 $768
Number of Head
>2500 163 $361 137 $285 166 $441
1,000–2,499 390 $172 309 $121 567 $254
500–999 381 $42 210 $18 482 $73
250–499 0 $0 0 $0 36 $0
<250 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Region
West 556 $348 357 $255 780 $475
Midwest 84 $48 81 $36 95 $60
South 176 $89 128 $63 217 $120
Northeast 118 $90 90 $70 159 $113
Notes: Carbon price 5 $13/ton. All values are in 2009 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Key and Sneeringer: Carbon Markets and Methane Digesters 585Recent decades have seen dramatic increases
in the scale of production in the dairy sector.
Dairies with at least 1,000 head now produce
almost a thirdof output, despitecomprisingonly
about 2% of all operations. Studies indicate that
there are substantial economies of scale in dairy
production (MacDonald et al., 2007; Mosheim
and Knox Lovell, 2009). The additional profits
that large farms could earn from digesters could
enhance these existing scale economies and
thereby contribute to further consolidation of
production over time.
There are several avenues by which private
actions and public sector investments and poli-
cies could promote the adoption of biogas sys-
tems by smaller-scale operations. Smaller-scale
livestock operations could achieve a more effi-
cient digester size by supplementing manurewith
food waste products from nearby crop or meat
processing facilities, breweries, bakeries, or res-
taurants (Minnesota Department of Agriculture,
2005). When mixed with manure, food waste can
provide an efficient feedstock for biogas pro-
duction and livestock operators can charge ‘‘tip-
ping fees’’ for receiving the waste. However, the
availability and suitability of food waste for di-
gestion may limit the economic and practical
feasibility of co-digestion to certain locations.
A centralized digester is another way that
smaller-scale operations could take advantage
of a more efficient digester size. With a cen-
tralized system, several nearby farms share a
single large digester. In addition to construction
and maintenance cost efficiencies, centralized
systems could increase marketing leverage in
negotiating electricity sales; improve access
to financing, tax credits, or grants; and could
permit a manager to develop specialized skill
in digester maintenance and operation (USEPA,
2002). The main disadvantage to centralized
digesters is the additional costs of transporting
manure to and from the central facility (Ghafoori
and Flynn, 2006).
If carbon offset prices are sufficiently high,
a lower-cost biogas system that flares methane
rather than using it to generate electricity may
become profitable. This approach removes
electricity generation from the biogas system,
which eliminates the costs of the generator,
electrical connections, and related maintenance.
This approach might be economically viable for
smaller-scale operations that would otherwise
find it difficult to finance or maintain an elec-
tricity generator. This option has the greatest
potential for operations with lagoons, as covers
can be installed relatively inexpensively and can

























All farms 934 $574 846 $487 1,040 $636
Number of Head
>2500 163 $361 144 $300 171 $400
1,000–2,499 390 $172 343 $148 470 $192
500–999 381 $42 359 $39 399 $44
250–499 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
<250 0 $0 0 $0 0 $0
Region
West 556 $348 493 $285 648 $389
Midwest 84 $48 84 $48 84 $48
South 176 $89 164 $82 178 $95
Northeast 118 $90 105 $73 130 $105
Notes: Carbon price 5 $13/ton. All values are in 2009 dollars.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, November 2011 586provide other benefits to producers such as odor
control and rain exclusion.
Obtaining financing for the large capital
investment associated with most biogas sys-
tems can be a particular barrier to adoption for
smaller-scale operations (Gloy and Dressler,
2010). Digesters have little resale value, mak-
ing their collateral value low. This problem
could be addressed by loan guarantee programs
such as the USDA’s Rural Energy for America
Program. The uncertainty surrounding digester
systems’ benefits and costs is another barrier to
financing and adoption. Investors who are un-
certain about the returns to a project are likely
to delay investment or require substantial com-
pensation forthe uncertainty (Stokes, Rajagopolan,
and Stefanou, 2008). Future climate legislation
could increase energy prices and raise carbon
offset prices far above current prices in regional
carbon trading schemes. However, there is a
great deal of uncertainty about the extent of these
price increases. Stable and long-term govern-
ment policies and programs can help reduce
price uncertainty and encourage investment, as
would the provision of long-term contracts for
carbon offsets and electricity.
Finally, government policies and programs
that raise returns to or lower costs of digesters
can provide incentives for smaller-scale oper-
ations to adopt methane digester. Many of these
policies can be targeted toward smaller-scale
operations.
[Received December 2010; Accepted June 2011.]
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Appendix A. Case Study Information and Parameters








Pit manure storage 1,786 $1,523,994 $958 $0.046 729
(1,006) (617,005) (0.296) (0.024) (0.404)
N3 7 3 7 3 7 5 8
Lagoon manure storage 2,458 $1,279,182 $863 $0.037 450
(2,326) (821,356) (0.486) (0.027) (0.136)
N8 8 8 4 4
Notes: Standard deviations shown in parentheses. An observation is a case study or vendor quote. The number of observations
varies according to the number of studies providing information on the specific variable. All dollar values have been converted
to 2009 real terms using the Chemical Engineering Plant Cost Index.
Source: See text for details.







Adjusted R-squared 0.612 0.624
Note: Standard errors shown in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Farm level data are drawn from the 2005 Dairy Pro-
duction Practices and Costs and Returns Report,
a portion of the Agricultural Resource and Manage-
ment Surveys (ARMS). The ARMS is a restricted-use
dataset compiled by the National Agricultural Sta-
tistics Service in conjunction with the Economic
Research Service of the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture. Farms must have sold $1,000 of agricultural
products in the prior year to qualify for the sample.
Manure Management
The ARMS allows farmers to record up to four
types of manure storage facilities. We classify the
following systems as lagoons: ‘‘Single stage lagoon
(for anaerobic or aerobic digestion)’’ and ‘‘Two stage
lagoon (for anaerobic or aerobic digestion in 1st
stage, storage in 2nd stage).’’ We characterize the
following as pit-based manure management: ‘‘Ma-
nure pit (open),’’ ‘‘Manure pit (covered),’’ ‘‘Slurry or
manure tank (open),’’ ‘‘Slurry or manure tank (cov-
ered),’’ and ‘‘Holding pond (for storage, not anaerobic
or aerobic digestion).’’ The other types of manure
storage systems that we do not characterize as either
pit or lagoon are ‘‘Stacking slab or other open storage
of manure’’ and ‘‘Manure barns or shed (covered
storage of manure).’’
Some farms have both manure and pit systems.
In these cases, we discern the percentage of manure
held in each type of system, and then use these per-
centages to weigh estimates dependant on the type of
manure management (electricity produced, methane
produced, and capital costs).
Number of Head
For dairies, ARMS provides the number of head in
three categories: Milk cows, dry cows, and breeding
bulls. We exclude breeding bulls and find the aver-
age number of milk and dry cows over the course of
the year.
Electricity Use
ARMS records the total amount spent on electricity.
We instead need the amount of electricity used. We
therefore use the state electricity price from the U.S.
Energy Information Administration to calculate
electricity used in kWh.
State Methane Emissions Factors
The Chicago Climate Exchange provides methane
emissions factors by livestock and manure manage-
ment system, for the categories of ‘‘dairy cow’’ and
‘‘dairy heifer.’’ Since the ARMS data do not distin-
guish between dairy cows and dairy heifers (just
between milk cows and dry cows), we only use the
emission factor for ‘‘dairy cows.’’
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